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Rights of Students 
in Public Schools 
Introduction 
It can safely be said that the rights of 
public school students hang in a balance. 
The two sides of this balance are the 
responsibilities of school officials to edu-
cate and to maintain a safe, disciplined 
environment and the constitutional 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights possessed 
by the students. The past four terms of the 
United States Supreme Court have pro-
duced three cases which address this bal-
ance.' 
The constitutional guarantees of public 
school students addressed in these recent 
cases and in this article concern the first 
and fourth amendments. As to the fourth 
amendment, the Supreme Court in New 
Jersey '0. T.LO.2 adopted a reasonable 
search standard lower than probable cause. 
The Court adopted a two-fold 
reasonableness inquiry to determine the 
constitutionality of the searches: (1) was 
the action justified at its inception, and (2) 
was the search reasonably related in scope 
to the circumstances that justified the 
search?) 
As to the first amendment, the concern 
has been whether the activity of the stu-
dent has a disruptive effect on the educa-
tional process and whether there was a 
substantial and reasonable basis for the 
school's response to the questionable 
action of the student. In Hazelwood School 
Dist. '0. Kuhlmeier,4 the Court held that 
"educators do not offend the first amend-
ment so long as their actions are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns."s The Court, in Bethel School Dist. 
'0. Fraser,6 held that a student's delivery of 
a sexually offensive and disruptive speech 
at a school assembly was not protected by 
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the first amendment, reasoning that the 
speech had disrupted the educational pro-
cess and that the school officials' interest 
outweighed that of the student.? 
The reasonableness standard applied in 
fourth amendment school cases is essential-
ly the same as the reasonable basis standard 
applied in first amendment school cases. 
Both standards focus upon a factual totali-
ty of the circumstances, with emphasis 
upon the special characteristics of the 
school environment and the importance of 
maintaining that environment. 
Under the reasonableness standards, 
school authorities have broad power to 
curtail student activities in order to main-
tain the school environment. School 
authorities frequently are able to justify 
their actions as reasonable in light of the 
concerns and public policy surrounding 
certain issues in schooling, i.e., discipline, 
drugs, violence, etc. This author believes 
that the judicial system should not allow 
these concerns to eliminate or reduce stu-
dent rights. 
Maryland has recently addressed the 
question of student's rights versus the 
school authorities in two of its localities: 
Baltimore City and Prince George's Coun-
ty. In Baltimore City, a task force was 
appointed in October, 1988, by Dr. 
Richard C. Hunter, superintendent of 
public schools, to study school violence. 
On November 17, 1988, the task force 
made the following recommendation to 
the superintendent: 
1. Hiring additional school police, bas-
ed on an assessment of need, who will 
wear uniforms but remain unarmed. 
2. Establishing a highly publicized hot 
line for tips on problems. 
3. Buying hand-held metal detectors. 
4. Installing a camera monitoring 
system with an intercom in large 
schools. 
5. Encouraging uniforms in elementa-
ry schools and dress codes, developed 
by students, parents and administra-
tors, for the higher grades. 
6. Appointing a community group to 
oversee how safety procedures are put 
into effect in the schools and student-
parent groups in each school to resolve 
safety issues. 
7. Promoting parent involvement by 
providing programs to assist parents 
dealing with their children and setting 
up rooms in schools where parents 
could gather to discuss problems.8 
These recommendations were adopted 
on December 1, 1988. It is interesting to 
note that "[t]he legal aspects of such moves 
were not discussed [at the school board 
meeting]".9 This is one example. of the 
scale tipping in favor of the school 
authorities. 
Another recent example deals with 
Eleanor Roosevelt High School in 
Greenbelt, Maryland. The school recently 
hired a new principal. The situation at 
Roosevelt is much the same as the situa-
tion was at the Hazelwood school (see 
infra). Roosevelt's principal had edited 
articles and advertisements out of the 
school newspaper. This action made stu-
dents angry and the faculty sponsor! advi-
sor of the paper quit. Hazelwood, however, 
is the law and the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the school authorities' right to 
edit the newspaper. 
This article traces the history of student 
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rights. It begins with cases which first rec-
ognized the constitutional rights of juven-
iles, inside and outside of the school envi-
ronment. Then, the article explores and 
compares the recent decisions of the 
Supreme Court concerning first and 
fourth amendments in the school 
environment. This analysis leads to the 
author's conclusion that the Court is 
moving away from the belief that students 
do not shed their constitutional rights at 
the school house gate. IO If this line of rea-
soning continues, public school officials in 
the future may be able to justify as reason-
able the vast majority of their actions 
against students. If so, students will not be 
protected to the same degree as adults by 
the same Bill of Rights. Justice Stewart 
expressed such a view in Tinker v. Des 
Moines School Dist., saying, "I cannot share 
the Court's uncritical assumption that 
rights of children are co-extensive with 
those of adults." II It appears that the pres-
ent Supreme Court shares Justice Stewart's 
view. 
I. History of Student Rights 
In response to the malfunctioning juven-
ile justice system, the Supreme Court 
decided a number of cases in the 1960's and 
the 1970's which acknowledged the appli-
cability of certain constitutional rights to 
juveniles. In Kent v. United States,12 the 
Supreme Court applied the fourteenth 
amendment due process clause and the 
sixth amendment right to counsel to juven-
ile criminal proceedings. Kent held that a 
waiver order from Juvenile Court to the 
District Court would only be valid if (1) a 
hearing had been held in the juvenile 
court; (2) counsel for the juvenile had 
access to the records from which the waiv-
er decision was made; and (3) the juvenile 
court had accompanied its waiver order 
with a statement of the reasons for its 
decision. JJ 
A landmark case which recognized that 
juveniles have constitutional rights equal 
to those of their adult counterparts is In re 
Gault. 14 The Supreme Court altered the 
juvenile adjudicatory process holding that 
fundamental fairness requires that due pro-
cess rights be afforded to juveniles. The 
Court held that a juvenile at the adjudica-
tory state has the same rights as an adult on 
trial. These rights are: (1) notice of the 
charges against him; (2) notice of the right 
to counsel; (3) the right of confrontation 
and cross-examination; and (4) the right 
against compelled self-incrimination. 
"Neither the fourteenth amendment nor 
the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."15 
In In re Winship,16 the Court announced 
the standard of proof needed when a 
juvenile is charged with an act that would 
constitute a crime if committed by an 
adult. The Court held that the applicable 
standard of proof is beyond a reasonable 
doubt as required by the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment. 17 
Kent, Gault, and Winship require that 
states afford the same constitutional safe-
guards to a juvenile that are mandated for 
an adult. Thus, the rights of juveniles 
appear to be coextensive with the rights of 
adults during the adjudicatory stages. 
The constitutional rights of students in 
the school context were recognized by the 
Court over forty years ago.18 In 1942, the 
West Virginia Board of Education passed a 
resolution requiring teachers and students 
to salute the flag. "Refusal to salute the flag 
[was] regarded as an act of insubordina-
tion, and ... dealt with accordingly."19 
The Court held that it was a violation of 
the first amendment for a state to make it 
compulsory for children to pledge alle-
giance to the flag.20 The Court reasoned 
that "[t]he fourteenth amendment ... 
protects the citizen against the State and all 
of its creatures, Boards of Education not 
excepted. These have ... important .,. 
"Neither the 
fourteenth 
amendment nor the 
Bill of Rights is for 
adults alone." 
and highly discretionary functions, but 
none that they may not perform within 
the limits of the Bill of Rights."21 
In 1968, Tinker v. Des Moines School 
Dist. 22 provided student rights advocates 
with their last big victory. In the context 
of the first amendment, the Court stated: 
"School officials do not possess absolute 
authority over their students. Students in 
school as well as out of school are 'persons' 
under our Constitution. They are 
possessed of fundamental rights which the 
state must respect .... "23 The first 
amendment expression in Tinker was the 
wearing of black armbands to school to 
protest the United States involvement in 
Vietnam. The principals of the Des 
Moines school district learned of the plan 
and established a rule prohibiting such 
conduct. Students who wore the bands 
were suspended from school until they 
returned without them. Other items, 
however, such as the iron cross Nazi 
symbol, were not banned. 
The Court noted that the wearing of the 
armbands was a quiet, passive, non-
disruptive act that neither infringed on the 
rights of other students nor materially and 
substantially interfered with the educa-
tional process.24 Even when "applied in 
light of the special characteristics of the 
school environment," first amendment 
rights are available to students.25 The 
Court stated: 
A student's rights, therefore, do not 
embrace merely the classroom hours. 
When he is in the cafeteria, or on the 
playing field, or on the campus during 
the authorized hours, he may express 
his opinions, even on controversial 
subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if 
he does so without "materially and 
substantially interfer[ing] with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline 
in the operation of the school" and 
without colliding with the rights of 
others.26 
The common bond in the foregoing 
cases is the overall awareness of the Bill of 
Rights application to students, even with 
frequent reference to the special nature of 
schools. Today, twenty years later, schools 
face many of the same problems. They also 
face new, or at least greatly increased, pro-
blems in the nature of drugs, weapons and 
teenage pregnancy. These new elements in 
the schools have caused legitimate appre-
hension. The question of whether a stu-
dent's actions materially and substantially 
interfere is overshadowed by the drive to 
rid the schools of these problems. The Bill 
of Rights requirements are becoming less 
stringent when applied to students. With 
the standards for compliance relaxed, are 
the rights of students being jeopardized? 
Are fear and public outcry molding new 
standards for the school environment? The 
three recent Supreme Court cases seem to 
suggest that the standard applied to stu-
dents is a lesser standard than that applied 
to adults. 
II. Fourth Amendment Searches 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their person, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and 
the person or things to be seizedP 
Prior to 1985, lower courts had addressed 
the fourth amendment's application to 
school searches. In Horton v. Goose Creek 
Indep. School Dist.,28 the Fifth Circuit held 
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that dog sniffin~ -.earches of the entire stu-
dent body violated the fourth amendment. 
The court acknowledged that the fourth 
amendment's basic concern is reasonable-
ness and that this reasonableness depends 
on the circumstances of each case. The 
court recognized that reasonable cause is 
the usual standard applied when action 
must be taken to maintain a safe environ-
ment conducive to education. The court 
pointed out, however, that "[t]he Consti-
tution does not permit good intentions to 
justify objectively outrageous intrusions 
on student privacy."29 The court conclud-
ed that dog sniffing constituted a search 
under the fourth amendment and that 
individualized suspICIOn would be 
required in order for the search to be con-
stitutional. In 1984, the Sixth Circuit held 
that the fourth amendment required a 
school official to have reasonable cause to 
conduct a search.JO The court noted "that 
not only must there be a reasonable 
ground to search, the search itself must be 
reasonable."JI 
In 1985, the United States Supreme 
Court decided New Jersey v. T.LO.,J2 a 
landmark case in the area of searches in the 
school environment. In T.LO., a teacher 
observed two female students smoking in 
the bathroom. Because the bathroom was 
not a designated smoking area, the stu-
dents (one was the defendant, T.L.O.) 
were brought to the vice-principal. When 
T.L.O. denied smoking, the vice-principal 
took her into an office and asked to see her 
purse. Upon opening it, he discovered a 
pack of cigarettes, rolling papers, marijua-
na, a pipe, a substantial amount of money 
in one dollar bills, an index card of 
LO.U.'s, and two letters implicating 
T.L.O. in marijuana dealing. Delinquency 
charges were subsequently brought against 
T.L.O. 
At the time of the search in T.LO., there 
were three possible theories on which to 
justify a student search: in loco parentis; 
fourth amendment probable cause; and 
fourth amendment reasonable suspicion. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court applied 
the in loco parentis theory, which means 
that school officials, in dealing with their 
students, obtain their authority from the 
parents. The New Jersey court held that 
the fourth amendment applies, but that 
the doctrine of in loco parentis lowers the 
standard used in determining the reasona-
bleness of the search. The interests the 
court considered in lowering the standard 
were the educational atmosphere, the rea-
sonable expectations of the students, and 
the realities of the classroom environment. 
The state court considered the following 
factors in determining the sufficiency of 
the cause to search: (1) age and school 
record of the individual; (2) prevalence and 
seriousness of the problem in the school; 
(3) exigency of the situation; (4) probative 
value and reliability of information justify-
ing the search; and (5) the teacher's prior 
experience with the student. 
The United States Supreme Court reject-
ed the in loco parentis standard and its 
notion of parental authority. The Court 
noted that public school authorities are 
state actors for purposes of the constitu-
tional guarantees of freedom of expres-
sionH and due process,34 and that it is 
difficult to understand why they should be 
deemed to be exercising parental rather 
than public authority when conducting 
searches of their students.J5 
The Court, however, also rejected 
application of the mandates of probable 
cause under the fourth amendment. The 
Court stated that the student's interest in 
privacy must be balanced against the 
school's interest in maintaining discipline 
and a safe environment and that "this bal-
ancing requires some easing of the restric-
tions to which searches by public 
authorities are ordinarily subject."J6 The 
fourth amendment requires a warrant and 
probable cause. The Court opined that the 
warrant requirement is unsuited to the 
CCThe Court, ... 
rejected application 
of the mandates of 
probab le cause . . . " 
school environment because such a 
requirement would interfere with the 
maintenance of discipline,J7 and that prob-
able cause is not an irreducible require-
ment.J8 "The fundamental command of 
the fourth amendment is that searches and 
seizures be reasonable."J9 
The Court in T.L O. adopted the third 
theory for justifying school searches, that 
of fourth amendment reasonable suspi-
cion. The Court then applied, for the first 
time in the context of a school search, its 
Terry v. Ohio40 two-prong test for 
reasonableness. This dual fourth amend-
ment reasonableness test was first used in 
Terry to allow police officers to intrude 
upon an individual's fourth amendment 
interest without a warrant or probable 
cause, but based on a reasonable suspi. 
cion,, 1 Specifically, the two-prong inquiry 
under the test is "whether the ... action was 
justified at its inception, and whether it 
was reasonably related in scope to the cir-
cumstances which justified the inter-
ference in the first place."42 
In applying the two-prong reasonable-
ness test to school search situations, this 
broad authority to search could be used 
whenever there is an alleged violation of a 
rule of the school, or whenever there is 
interference with school discipline and 
order. The search, however, must still be 
reasonable in light of the particular viola-
tion. The Court opined that the opening 
of the purse was justified based on the 
teacher's observations of the two students 
smoking. One commentator, critical of 
T.LO.'s holding, expressed the view that 
the discovery of the cigarettes answered 
the vice-principal's question and thus the 
search should have ended at that point. In 
addition, "the school official did not have 
probable cause to conduct the search since 
neither possession of cigarettes nor lying 
about one's smoking habits is relevant to 
whether a student has been smoking in a 
non-designated area in the school."43 The 
Court, however, did not consider this fac-
tor but merely applied the two-prong test, 
answering both questions affirmatively. 
"The reasonableness standard should 
ensure that the interests of students will be 
invaded no more than is necessary to 
achieve the legitimate end of preserving 
order in the schools."H No safeguards, 
however, are set forth in the standard to 
accompany this assurance. The interests of 
the students, in effect, are left in the hands 
of school authorities. 
T.LO. leaves the following areas unre-
solved: the standard to be applied in locker 
searches45 or student automobile sear-
ches;46 whether individualized suspicion is 
required;·7 the permissibility of strip sear-
ches;48 and whether the standard should be 
different when there is police involve-
ment,,9 Because of the need to maintain 
order and discipline within the school 
environment, school authorities may con-
duct a search, not justified on probable 
cause but on a lesser, reasonableness stand-
ard for children. Hence, in the fourth 
amendment area, student's rights are not 
coextensive with those of adults. 
In post-T.L O. cases courts have held that 
reasonable suspicion is the proper standard 
to determine the validity of a search by a 
school official. In Cason v. COOk,50 a female 
high school student challenged a search 
conducted by the female vice-principal. 
The search was conducted in the presence 
of a female police officer who was assigned 
to the school as a liaison officer. As a result 
of the search, a stolen coin purse was 
found. The police officer conducted a pat-
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down of Cason only after the stolen coin 
purse was found. The Eighth Circuit 
rejected imposing a probable cause war-
rant requirement. The police liaison did 
not initiate the search nor question Cason. 
The school official initiated the investiga-
tion, acting upon her own authority, not 
that of the police. The court held that the 
correct standard to apply was the standard 
enunciated in T.L O. 
Even in situations in which the school 
official is acting in loco parentis, such as 
chaperoning a school trip, the courts have 
relied on the standards enunciated in 
T.LO. In Webb v. McCullouglJ51, a high 
school principal searched a student's hotel 
room during a field trip. The room 
searched was assigned to Webb and three 
other female students. The principal had 
been informed by other chaperones that 
the students had consumed alcohol and 
that they had used an unoccupied room 
adjacent to Webb's room. Although the 
Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the dis-
trict court for failure to correctly apply 
the T.L o. test, the court did note that 
T.L O. governs searches of students by 
school officials. 
The reasonableness standard announced 
in T.LO. has consistently withstood chal-
lenges of unconstitutionality. Today, the 
need to maintain a particular school envi-
ronment outweighs the right of the stu-
dent to be secure from unreasonable 
searches. The student thus becomes the 
victim, learning the lesson of double stand-
ards; one for adults and a lesser standard 
for the student. 
III. First Amendment Speech and 
Expression 
Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of griev-
ances.52 
In 1986, the United States Supreme 
Court decided Bethel School Dist. No. 403 
v. Fraser63• In Bethel, sanctions were 
imposed against a student for giving an 
indecent, lewd, and offensive speech. Fra-
ser nominated a fellow student for office 
during an assembly that was mandatory 
for the students. His nominating speech 
was full of sexual metaphors: 
I know a man who is firm-he's firm 
in his pants, he's fum in his shirt, his 
character is firm-but most ... of al~ 
his belief in you, the students of 
Bethel, is firm. 
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his 
point and pounds it in. If necessary, 
he'll take an issue and nail it to the 
wall. He doesn't attack things in 
spurts-he drives hard, pushing and 
pushing until finally-he succeeds. 
Jeff is a man who will go to the very 
end-even the climax, for each and 
every one of yoU.54 
The speech evoked the student audience 
to jeer, hoot, holler, and simulate the acts 
to which Fraser was alluding. Fraser was 
found to have violated a school discipli-
nary rule. He was suspended for three days 
and his name was removed from the list of 
candidates for graduation speaker. Fraser, 
however, only served two of the three sus-
pended days and was the graduation speak-









The Supreme Court upheld the actions 
by the school. Although school officials 
do not have limitless discretion to apply 
their own notions of indecency, the 
nominating speech was found to be 
offensive and to have disrupted the 
educational process of the school.55 
Referring to T.LO., the Court once again 
expressed the view that the rights of 
students in public schools are not 
"automatically coextensive" with the 
rights of adults: "It does not follow ... that 
simply because the use of an offensive 
form of expression may not be prohibited 
to adults making what the speaker 
considers a political point, that same 
latitude must be permitted to children in a 
public school."56 The school board may 
decide what form of speech is appropriate 
and the first amendment is not offended if 
it is found that the speech "would 
undermine the school's basic educational 
mission."57 Fraser's speech disrupted the 
educational process and therefore no 
balancing was required. 
More recently, in Hazelwood School Dist. 
v. Kuhlmeier,58 the United States Supreme 
Court stated that the first amendment 
rights of students in public schools "are 
not automatically coe"xtensive with the 
rights of adults in other settings," and 
must be "applied in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environ-
ment."59 Hazelwood involved a high 
school newspaper (the Spectrum) and its 
editorial process. The paper was written 
by the school's journalism class. The teach-
er in charge of the class submitted proofs 
to the principal prior to publication as part 
of the normal editorial process followed 
by the school. In its final issue for the 
school year, two articles disturbed the 
principal. One dealt with teenage pregnan-
cy and the other addressed divorce. Each 
page on which these articles appeared was 
withheld from publication in its entirety. 
Consequently, six articles were removed 
from the final issue. The principal believed 
that this was the only means available to 
make sure the paper would be published 
by the end of the school year. The students 
challenged the principal's action as consti-
tuting censorship in violation of their first 
amendment rights. They also claimed that 
the Spectrum was a public forum. The 
Supreme Court held that the students' first 
amendment rights were not violated by 
the principal's actions. 
In 1943, the Court held that "it is now 
a commonplace that censorship or sup-
pression of expression of opinion is 
tolerated by our Constitution only when 
the expression presents a clear and present 
danger of action of a kind the State is empo· 
wered to prevent and punish. "60 In 1966, the 
Fifth Circuit stated: 
[S]chool officials cannot ignore expres-
sions of feeling with which they do 
not wish to contend. They cannot 
infringe on their students' rights to 
free and unrestricted expression as 
guaranteed to them under the First 
Amendment to the Constitution, 
where the exercise of such rights in the 
school buildings and schoolrooms do 
not materially and substantially inter-
fere with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school 61 
Hazelwood moves away from these recog-
nitions. The two newspaper articles pre-
sented no clear and present danger to the 
school nor did they materially and 
susbstantially interfere with the require-
ments of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school. Instead, it was 
merely a situation in which the topics dis-
cussed and the manner in which they were 
presented bothered the principal. 
Bethel held "the undoubted freedom to 
advocate unpopular and controversial views 
in schools and classrooms that must be bal-
anced against the society's counter-
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vailing interest in teaching students the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behav-
ior."62 Although an argument might be 
made that teen pregnancy exceeds these 
boundaries, it should be balanced against 
the need to make students aware of the 
risks of engaging in sex. Teen sex is not 
necessarily advocated by publishing an 
article on teen pregnancy. The process of 
balancing first amendment interests 
against the boundaries of socially apprcr 
priate behavior may leave students 
unprotected, not only when their constitu-
tional rights are concerned, but also when 
adult decisions are involved. 
The Court in Hazelwood balanced the 
student's rights with the countervailing 
interests and held that the school's action 
was reasonably related to legitimate con-
cerns and that the school censoring of the 
articles was done in an editorial role. The 
Court also rejected the notion that the 
paper was a public forum.63 The school 
newspaper is not a traditional public 
forum and hence the school need not dem-
onstrate compelling reasons for the remov-
al of the articles. The Spectrum was a 
product of the journalism class. 
Hazelwood was also distinguished from 
the first amendment question addressed in 
Tinker. The Court stated that "the ques-
tion addressed in Tinker is different from 
the question whether the first amendment 
requires schools affirmatively to promote 
particular student speech."64 Tinker dealt 
with personal expression. Hazelwood, 
however, was concerned with expression 
which might reasonably be perceived "to 
bear the imprimatur of the school."65 
Therefore, the Court held that the stan-
dard was not the same and "educators do 
not offend the first amendment by exercis-
ing editorial control over the style and 
content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as 
their actions are reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns."66 This 
standard is consistent with the view that 
education is not the responsibility of the 
courts. The principal was concerned that 
the teen pregnancy article did not protect 
the identity of those involved and was 
inappropriate for younger students. His 
objection with the divorce article was that 
it named parents without their consent 
and did not present their view on the 
topic. The Court ruled that these short-
comings with the articles justified the prin-
cipal's actions. 
Justice Brennan's dissent characterized 
the Spectrum as a "forum established to 
give students an opportunity to express 
their views."67 He expressed his view that 
the deleted articles "neither disrupte[d] 
classwork nor invade[d] the rights of 
others:"6B The dissent felt the first amend-
ment standard of Tinker was relevant to 
Hazelwood. Tinker dealt with speech that 
"materially disrupts." In Hazelwood, six 
articles were deleted, not just the two that 
disturbed the principal. The dissenters 
believed that the principal could have 
removed those two articles only, and 
characterized the removal of all six as "un-· 
thinking contempt for individual 
rights."69 
These recent first amendment cases are 
silencing students' views. To have a con-
troversial opinion and to express it are prcr 
tected first amendment rights. The recent 
court opinions indicate that this right is 
diminishing in the school environment. 
The standard of "materially and substan-
tially interfere" is both vague and over-
broad and allows school authoritites broad 
discretionary power to curtail speech and 
ideas of which they disapprove. 
Conclusion 
These three recent Supreme Court 
decisions demonstrate the manner in 
which students' rights are "balanced" 
against the concerns of schools in main-
taining the school environment. This bal-
ancing test occurs in both first and fourth 
amendment areas. Today, schools' 
interests outweigh the student's rights. No 
protections are announed in this balancing 
test for guaranteeing that schools will not 
overstep their authority. The silence may 
be partly based on the belief "that the edu-
cation of the nation's youth is primarily 
the responsibility of parents, teachers, and 
state and local school officials, and not of 
federal judges."70 The focal point of the 
balancing test is one of fact-bound 
reasonableness. 
Recently, a federal district court in 
Indiana upheld as reasonable a high 
school's proposed program for drug test-
ing its athletes.71 The court relied on 
T.L 0., noting that the T.L o. decision 
does not require individualized suspicion. 
The court held that the random urinalysis 
. cCSchools' interests 
outweigh the 
student's rights." 
testing program "constitutes [a] search 
that is justified at its inception by [the] 
school's legitimate need to ensure drug-
free athletes and [the testing program] 
reasonably balances school's needs against 
students' privacy interests and thus, does 
not violate the fourth amendment."72 
Because the program had not yet been 
implemented, the court saw no reason to 
issue a prior judicial restraint. 
A final question is whether the Bill of 
Rights even protects students. This 
question is avoided with the answer that 
students' rights are not coextensive with 
those of adults.73 If not coextensive, do 
these protections exist at all? 
The Court seems to be saying that the 
Bill of Rights does protect students, but 
the applicable standards in applying the 
Bill of Rights are less stringent in the first 
and fourth amendment areas. The reason 
for the lessening of the standards is the 
concern and desire to maintain a particular 
school environment. The school rules and 
regulations are seen as reasonable means of 
accomplishing this goal. Although 
students do not yield their rights, they 
must forego some of the protection 
afforded adults by the same rights. As the 
federal court in Indiana noted: 
Over the course of the last few years, 
the Supreme Court of the United 
States has clearly defined the 
constitutional rights of students in the 
public school setting, as different than 
rights enjoyed in other settings. 
Although it remains true that students 
do not "shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of expression at the 
schoolhouse gate," that concept has 
been considerably narrowed and 
refined by subsequent cases.74 
If the Supreme Court continues its present 
course, the concept will become even 
more narrowed and refined. 
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